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Design Defect Liability and Prescription Drugs:
Who's in Charge?
DAVID S. TORBORG*
While the Restatement (Second) of Torts generally imposes strict liability
upon manufacturers of defectively designed products, it provides an exemption
from this general rule for unavoidably unsafe products, most notably including
certain pharmaceutical products. Courts have split over the extent of this
exemption. A majority ofjursdictions examine each particular pharmaceutical
product to determine whether the policy behind the exemption applies to that
pharmaceutical, while a minority of jurisdictions grant blanket exemption to
any drug which has obtained FDA approval. The ALl is currently working on a
proposed Restatement (Third) which closely follows, without expressly
adopting, the latter approach. However, this proposal does not go far enough.
National legislation regarding pharmaceutical design defect liability is long
overdue. FDA experts are far more competent than juries or judges in
determining whether the benefits of a particular pharmaceutical outweigh its
risks. Furthermore, federal pre-emption of state law can create the desired
consistency in application among states and keep litigation costs to a minimum.
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the innumerable products available to consumers, prescription
drugs are unique.' While many consumer products seek to make life more
convenient or enjoyable for the user, prescription drugs often make that life
possible. The unique nature and utility of prescription drugs has led to a distinct
niche in the products liability field. This niche finds its roots in the controversial
comment k2 to Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts3-perhaps
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graciously offered throughout the preparation of this Comment: Professor Arthur Greenbaum,
Angelique M. Paul, George Hoskins, and the entire editing staff of the Ohio State Law
Journal. This Comment is dedicated to my father, Peter Torborg, who taught me the value of
hard work and an inquisitive mind.
I See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
But there is an important distinction between prescription drugs and other products such
as construction machinery .... In the latter cases [not dealing with prescription drugs],
the product is used to make work easier or to provide pleasure, while in the former
[cases dealing with prescription drugs] it may be necessary to alleviate pain and suffering
or to sustain life.
Id. at 478.
2 RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
3 This section reads:
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the most economically influential section of any Restatement. In Section 402A,
commonly known as "strict liability," the American Law Institute (ALl)
recognized a policy decision which several courts made towards demanding
both enhanced product and consumer safety. 4 Strict liability, besides expanding
the scope of who can be sued, eliminates the plaintiff's burden of showing that
a manufacturer was negligent or at fault when designing, manufacturing, or
marketing a product. Briefly stated, the doctrine of strict liability was
established to further three basic policy concerns. First, because the injuries
caused by the product's defective design or malfunction are extremely
unpredictable, it is thought that the industries manufacturing these products are
better able to compensate for these incidents by (1) adjusting the price of the
product, or (2) obtaining insurance for the possibility of product liability, i.e.
"loss spreading." 5 Second, the doctrine of strict liability is thought to provide
incentives for the manufacturer to produce safer products. 6 Finally, even if fault
or negligence on the part of the manufacturer were present, it is too difficult, if
not impossible, to prove these elements due to the technical complexities
inherent in modem products. 7 Therefore, the doctrine of strict liability is
believed to be a necessary aid to the plaintiff's success on his or her claim.8
Comment k to Section 402A,9 providing an exemption from strict liability
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or the consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. §402A.
4 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944) (lraynor, J.,
concurring).
5 W. PAGE KEErON Er AL., PROSSOR AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 98, at
692-93 (5th ed. 1984).
6 See id. at 693.
7 See id.
8 See id.
9 Comment k provides:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
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for certain "unavoidably unsafe products," reflects a different policy rationale-
the affordability and availability of certain pharmaceutical products and
vaccines. 10 The comment seeks to insulate from the doctrine of strict liability
those products that ought not be subject to such sweeping liability because their
unique utility justifies their availability, even in the face of recognized dangers.
Comment k recognizes the fear that imposing strict liability on pharmaceutical
manufacturers may hinder the industry's ability to adequately provide such
uniquely beneficial products by making the production and marketing of
pharmaceuticals too risky a business.
To illustrate the effect of comment k, consider the following. When a
consumer successfully recovers on a strict product liability claim, the consumer
has established, at least to the court or jury, that the product in question was
"unreasonably dangerous."" The purpose of comment k is to establish that
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. An outstanding
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads
to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected. Since the disease itself
leads invariably to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of the vaccine are
fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk which they involve.
Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direction and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs,
vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except
to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in particular of
many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of
purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of
the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for
unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known
but apparently reasonable risk.
REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).
10 See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470, 475 (Cal. 1988)
("[lit would be 'against the public interest' to apply the doctrine [strict liability] to such
products [prescription drugs] because of 'the very serious tendency to stifle medical research
and testing.'") (quoting 38 A.L.I. PRoc. 50, 90-92 (1961)); Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div.
of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297, 306 (Idaho 1987).
1
'RESrAIMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Unreasonably dangerous. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the
defective condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or
consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption,
and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from over-
consumption.... The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which
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"some products" are not "unreasonably dangerous" to the consumer, even if
they are "quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary
use." 12 Hence, if a manufacturer can establish that its product falls within the
range of products protected by comment k, the product will automatically fail
the necessary "unreasonably dangerous" condition of strict liability, and the
plaintiff will be forced to pursue the manufacturer on ordinary negligence
grounds, which require a showing of fault by the manufacturer.
Because pharmaceutical products were specifically included in the
definition of "unavoidably unsafe products," 13 pharmaceutical companies
wasted little time in using the comment as a defense in prescription drug and
vaccine tort liability cases. 14 Most commonly, comment k has been invoked in
design defect cases. 15 Comment k, by its very language, seems to preclude its
use in defending against failure-to-warn and manufacturing defect cases: "Such
a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper direction and
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey is not
unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some people drunk, and is
especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of
fuel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely
because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco containing something like
marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous
merely because, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to
heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is unreasonably
dangerous.
Id. cmt. i.
12 Id. cnt. k.
13 Id.
14 See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 425-26 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting
that for products falling under the comment k umbrella, strict liability cannot be used unless
the consumer establishes a breach of the manufacturer's duty to warn); Chambers v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 380-81 (D. Md. 1975), aj"dper curiam, 567 F.2d 269 (4th
Cir. 1977) (holding that manufacturer of oral contraceptives escapes liability, and noting that
comment k transforms the strict liability claim to a negligence claim); Gaston v. Hunter, 588
P.2d 326, 338-41 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that manufacturer avoids design defect
liability for experimental drug chymopapain, used for back pain, because of comment k).
15 Not only does comment k preclude its use by defendants in failure-to-warn and
manufacturing defect cases, it provides further support for a plaintiff's claim that strict
liability should be used to hold defendants liable in failure-to-warn and mamfacturing defect
cases. The reasoning behind this assertion is that comment k provides an exception to its rule
if the conditions of comment k are not satisfied because of improper warning or manufacture.
See RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). Strict liability will still apply
under these circumstances. Therefore, while comment k can be used to protect against design
defect claims, it is ineffectual in defending against failure-to-warn or mamfacturing defect
cases and, in fact, seems to promote such claims.
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warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.' 6 Therefore, one
should conclude that comment k is aimed at protecting some class of products
from a claim that they are defectively designed. The controversy, as discussed
below, 17 centers around what is included in that class of products.
More recently, comment k protection has been extended to design defect
cases involving medical devices, as courts have found that the policy reasons
for protecting prescription drugs also apply to protecting medical devices.18
While on the surface this analogy makes sense, the inclination to treat
prescription drugs and medical devices identically causes some concern. For
example, the Supreme Court of Utah has relied on different policy grounds than
those originally stated in comment k to justify its decision to provide comment k
protection to all prescription drugs ("blanket immunity"). 19 Because many of
these policy rationales are unique to prescription drugs, 20 and may not apply to
medical devices, the focus of this Comment will be on prescription drugs
(including vaccines), rather than medical devices.
Additionally, the concern of this Comment is manufacturer liability for
design defects. When a consumer alleges that he or she has been injured due to
the effects of a prescription drug, there are many avenues for recovery. Most
typically, the consumer alleges a failure-to-warn. 21 Additional possibilities
16 Id. (emphasis added).
17 See infra Part ]I.
18 See, e.g., Perfetti v. McGhan Medical, 662 P.2d 646 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983)
(applying comment k to breast implants); Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881 (Okla.
1994) (considering whether penile implants deserved comment k protection, eventually
concluding they do); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982) (applying comment k to
intrauterine devices); Hoyt v. Vitek, Inc., 894 P.2d 1225 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (considering
whether temporomandibular implants deserve comment k protection, eventually concluding
that they do not, after weighing risks and benefits).
19 See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). Specifically, the court in
Grundberg cited the elaborate regulatory system overseen by the FDA, the cost-effectiveness
of prescription drugs, and the difficulties of non-scientists in understanding "the numerous
chemical properties of the product and their relationship to the vast physiologic idiosyncracies
of each consumer for whom the drug is designed." Id. at 95-96, 99.
20 For example, the FDA approval process for medical devices is far less complex than
it is for prescription drugs. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996). The
FDA separates medical devices into three classes (1, 1, and 1Il) depending on the risk that
they pose to the public (Class I posing the least risk). Only Class Il devices require pre-
market approval, which requires testing averaging 1200 hours. Id. at 2247. Most Class 111
devices on the market today, however, escaped elaborate testing because of exceptions to the
pre-market approval requirement (the most common being a grandfathering provision and a
"substantially similar" to already existing products exception). Id. Therefore, the Gnmdberg
court's reliance on the elaborate FDA regulatory structure may not apply to medical devices.
21 Failure-to-warn claims easily constitute the overwhelming majority of prescription
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include fraud22 and manufacturing defects.23 Hence, while many of the legal
approaches discussed in this Comment would preclude plaintiffs from
succeeding on a design defect claim, an injured consumer is far from without a
remedy.24
This Comment explores the evolving nature, and possible future, of design
defect liability regarding prescription drugs and vaccines. Part II of this
Comment analyzes the differing approaches state courts have taken in
interpreting comment k and the reasoning behind those decisions. Part III
provides a thumbnail sketch of the ALI's proposed draft regarding liability for
design defects in the pharmaceutical industry. Part IV discusses the role of the
federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in regulating prescription drugs,
focusing on the specific measures taken by the FDA regarding a combined
diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis vaccine (DPT), a vaccine that has been the
subject of successful plaintiff recoveries on a design defect claim. Finally, Part
V argues for federal legislation in this area so that a consistent products liability
landscape can be established in the area of prescription drug design defect
liability.
II. THE LACK OF UNIFORMITY IN APPLYING COMMENT K TO
PRESCRIPTION DRUG DESIGN DEFECT LIABILITY CLAIMS
Courts disagree on the appropriate way to interpret and apply the basic
premise of comment k. The difficulty centers around which pharmaceutical
products should be classified as comment k products, and therefore immune
drug liability cases. See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision
of Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CoRNELL L. REv. 1512, 1537
(1992).
22 One of the most notable examples of pharmaceutical litigation concerned fraud on the
part of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. In 1960, Merrell Dow's application to market
MER/29, a drug designed to reduce the level of cholesterol in the bloodstream, was approved
by the FDA. The drug was eventually found to result in numerous side effects, including
cataracts, baldness, and severe dermatitis. An FDA inspection of Merrell Dow records
subsequent to the drug's withdrawal from the market revealed that the FDA had received
incorrect animal data from the company. It is estimated that Merrell Dow paid over $200
million in damages. See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life
Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 315 (1992) (quoting Gina B. Kolata, How Safe
Is Bendectin?, 210 SCIENCE 518, 519 (1980)).
23 See M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUClS LIABiIrY § 9.2, at 322 (2d ed. 1988)
("ditinguishing manufacturing defects from design defects).
24 See generally Grndberg, 813 P.2d at 97 ("Plaintiffs may still recover under a strict
liability claim by demonstrating that the product was unreasonably dangerous due to an
inadequate warning, a manufacturing flaw, mismarketing, or misrepresenting information to
the FDA.-).
[Vol. 59:633
DESIGNDEFECTLIABILITY
from strict liability claims of defective design (assuming proper warning and
preparation). Most courts agree that at least some prescription drugs should be
given protection from strict liability claims.25 These courts, however, follow
two distinct models in determining the scope of comment k protection:
(1) comment k protection for prescription drugs must be determined on a case-
by-case basis, so that some prescription drugs deserve protection from strict
liability, while others do not; and (2) all prescription drugs that acquire FDA
approval, absent fraud, should be protected from strict design defect liability.
This second approach is commonly known as the "blanket immunity"
approach. Essentially, the difference between the opposing views is that the
case-by-case model posits that comment k was never intended to cover all
prescription drugs, but only those drugs making a major contribution to public
health, while those following the blanket immunity approach feel that all
prescription drugs should be insulated from strict design defect liability as a
matter of public policy and judicial fairness.
A. Case-by-Case Method
A majority of courts that have considered the application of comment k
have adopted the case-by-case approach, concluding that prescription drugs are
not automatically shielded from design defect liability.26 These courts are
25 Some courts, however, have rejected comment k entirely. In Shanks v. Upjohn Co.,
835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992), the Alaska Supreme Court found it unnecessary to adopt a
different liability standard for prescription drugs, noting that comment k added confusion to
the already blurry distinction between strict liability and negligence. See id. at 1197. The
court also questioned the policy rationale behind comment k, stating that "we find it
speculative at best that restricting strict liability design defect claims against prescription drug
manufacturers will serve the public interest by enhancing the availability and affordability of
prescription drugs." Id. at 1195. While the Alaska Supreme Court rejected comment k, it has
not rejected the policy underlying unavoidably unsafe products. See id. at 1198. Alaska
instead treats each drug on a case-by-case basis, as it would any ordinary product, to
determine if the product was unreasonably dangerous. See id. Therefore, Alaska's treatment
of pharmaceutical design defects is, in substance, really no different than those states which
apply comment k on a case-by-case basis, as discussed below. See id.; infra Part II.A. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has reached a similar conclusion. See Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,
342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984).
26 See, e.g., Rohrbough v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 470, 476-77 (N.D. W. Va.
1989) (stating that design of vaccine is subject to ordinary risk-utility analysis), aft'd, 916
F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 695 F. Supp. 432, 433 (D. Minn.
1988) (holding that a single balancing test for reasonableness determines liability for design
defects); West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 611-13 (Ark. 1991) (noting that a
manufacturer may defend against design defect claim by demonstrating through risk-utility
analysis that product was unavoidably unsafe); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728,
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faithful to the precise language of comment k itself, asserting that comment k
will only shield the manufacturer from design defect liability if the court finds
that the drug's benefits outweigh the drug's risks.27 While this determination is
usually made by the trial judge, at least one court has concluded that the risk-
benefit balancing is a question of fact for the jury if "reasonable minds can
differ on the question." 28 One of the earliest cases utilizing the case-by-case
approach was Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories.29 In Kearl, a patient who received
an oral polio vaccine brought a products liability action against the
manufacturer of the vaccine after the patient began to develop paralysis. The
court was asked to decide whether comment k applied to the polio vaccine at
issue. In making that determination, the court set out the following three-part
test: (1) Was the product intended to provide an "exceptionally important
benefit that made its availability highly desirable?"; (2) Was the risk posed by
the product "substantial" and "unavoidable" when distributed?; and (3) Did
"the interest in availability... outweigh[ ] the interest in promoting enhanced
accountability?" 30
The basic purpose of comment k, according to courts adhering to the case-
by-case approach, is to protect from liability a product that is especially
beneficial to society. These courts reason that comment k was never intended to
apply to all prescription drugs.31 They hold that a distinction must be drawn
732-33 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that protection from design defect liability extends
only to products that pass risk-utility balancing test for reasonable design, not to all drugs and
medical devices per se); Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d
297, 308-09 (Idaho 1987) (stating in dictum that protection from design defect claims will be
given only on a case-by-case basis; that applicability of "unavoidably unsafe" exemption
depends on whether the product's benefits outweigh the risks; and that comment k by its
terms does not give "blanket immunity" to all drugs); White v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., 533
N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 1988) (holding prescription drugs do not, per se, fall within comment
k, but will be considered on a case-by-case basis); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.,
546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988) (holding that exemption from strict liability based on design
defect will be available only if drug's apparent benefits outweigh apparent risks).
27 See supra note 26.
28 Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 781-82.
29 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overruled by Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470, 481-83 (Cal. 1988).
30 Id. at 464 (emphasis added).
31 See, e.g., Toner, 732 P.2d at 308.
Obviously, the comment [k] does not apply to al! drugs. Rather, the comment applies
"when the situation calls for it," which is when the product is unavoidably unsafe, but is
"an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently
reasonable risk," or with an unknown risk which is not yet reasonably discoverable at
the time of marketing.
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between drugs which have an enormously profound impact on society's health
and drugs which merely make life more convenient. 32
B. Blanket Immunity Approach
A minority of jurisdictions have applied comment k's protection from
design defect liability to all prescription drugs.33 The landmark case introducing
the blanket immunity approach was Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott
Laboratories).34 In Brown, the California Supreme Court overruled the initial
risk-benefit analysis enunciated in Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,35 reasoning
that the policy underlying comment k (increased availability of affordably
priced drugs and vaccines) is frustrated by the case-by-case risk-benefit
balancing approach:
Under the "mini-trial" directed by Kearl, a drug manufacturer has no
assurance that a product he places on the market will be measured by the
liability standard of comment k because the trial judge could decide that the
benefit of the drug was not "exceptionally important" so as to make its
availability "highly desirable," or that the interest in its availability did not
outweigh the public's interest in subjecting the producer to strict
liability.... A manufacturer's incentive to develop what it might consider a
superior product would be diminished if it might be held strictly liable for
harmful side effects because a trial court could decide, perhaps many years
later, that in fact another product which was available would have
accomplished the same result.36
The court in Brown also expressed concern that the case-by-case approach
would lead to inconsistent results and increased litigation costs. 37 Hence, the
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965)). 1
32 See id. at 306 ("This weighing process should consider the value of the benefit, the
seriousness of the risk, and the likelihood of both.").
33 See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly & Co., Prozac Prods. Liab. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D.
Ind. 1992); Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg v.
Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991); Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59 (Wash.
1996).
34 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
35 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overnded by Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470, 481-83 (Cal. 1988).
36 Brown, 751 P.2d at 481-82.37 See id. Subsequent decisions from other jurisdictions have criticized and rejected
Brown's policy determinations. See, e.g., West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Ark.
1991) ("We adopt this second view [case-by-case approach] because of the wording of the
comment itself and because it is the better public policy."); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb &
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state that first articulated the case-by-case approach was also the first to
abandon it-in favor of blanket immunity. Most other states, however, have
failed to follow a similar path.
A more recent, and expansive, decision granting blanket immunity from
design defect liability to prescription drugs was offered by the Utah Supreme
Court in Grndberg v. Upjohn Co.38 In Grundberg, the plaintiff shot her
mother allegedly as a result of taking a 0.5 milligram dose (the manufacturer's
recommended dose) of Halcion, an insomnia drug. She filed suit, claiming not
only that Upjohn failed to warn of the drug's dangers, but also that Halcion was
defectively designed. The Utah Supreme Court would not allow recovery on
the design defect claim, invoking comment k. The court refused an attempt to
reconcile the language of comment k with the blanket immunity approach;
instead, it flatly admitted that the blanket immunity approach runs counter to the
express language of the Restatement. 39 The Grundberg court, like the court in
Brown, felt that comment k's policy rationale is better served by the blanket
immunity approach.40
The strength of the Grundberg decision is the increased attention the court
paid to the underlying justifications for limiting design defect liability for
prescription drugs. First, the court noted the "unique nature and value" of
prescription drugs, namely that "[b]ecause prescription drugs are chemical
compounds designed to interact with the chemical and physiological processes
of the human body, they will almost always pose some risk of side effects in
certain individuals. ' 41 Second, and most importantly, the court outlined the
extensive influence of the FDA regulatory scheme,42 a factor given a mere
footnote of attention in Brown.43 The cornerstone of the Grundberg opinion is
the court's conclusion that the proper forum for making the determination of
whether or not a drug's benefits outweigh its risks rests within the FDA, not
with the individual judges and juries.44
Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988) ("Although both approaches have merit, we
believe the societal interest in ensuring the development and marketing of prescription drugs
will be adequately served by extending comment-k protection to prescription drugs on a case-
by-case basis.").
38 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991).
39 See id. at 95 ("[We need not be bound by the specific language of comment k and
may adopt and apply its fundamental policy without restricting ourselves to what we perceive
to be its literal interpretation.").
40 See id.
41 Id.
42 See id. at 96-98.
43 See Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470, 483 n.12 (Cal. 1988).
44 See Grndtberg, 813 P.2d at 99. The court stated:
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C. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Two Approaches
It is readily apparent that both the case-by-case and blanket immunity
approaches each have advantages over the other. Each can be persuasively
argued. The case-by-case approach is truer to the original rationale behind
comment k-only those pharmaceutical products that have a significantly
positive effect on public health should be protected from strict liability, not all
prescription drugs per se. The case-by-case approach also allows an additional
avenue of attack for the suffering patient, so that the cost of recovery may be
borne by the manufacturer who can more easily spread the loss. The blanket
immunity approach, on the other hand, allows for more consistent results, less
litigation, and arguably better serves the policies of comment k. Because the
courts disagree on which approach to adopt, pharmaceutical manufacturers
currently face different design defect liability standards depending on in which
state the plaintiff files his or her claim. This inconsistency has led the ALI to
reevaluate comment k. As a result, the ALI has proposed an entirely separate
section in the Restatement (Third) of Torts devoted specifically to
pharmaceutical liability, entitled "Liability of Seller or Other Distributor for
Harm Caused by Defective Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices." 45
To determine whether a drug's benefit outweighs its risk is inherently complex because
of the manufhcturer's conscious design choices regarding the numerous chemical
properties of the product and their relationship to the vast physiologic idiosyncracies of
each consumer for whom the drug is designed. Society has recognized this complexity
and in response has reposed regulatory authority in the FDA. Relying on the FDA's
screening and surveillance standards enables courts to find liability under circumstances
of inadequate warning, mismanufacture, improper marketing, or misinforming the
FDA-avenues for which the courts are better suited. Although this approach denies
plaintiffs one potential theory on which to rely in a drug products liability action, the
benefits to society in promoting the development, availability, and reasonable prices of
drugs justifies this conclusion.
Id. Furthermore, the court was swayed by the technical expertise of the FDA:
Although the FDA may have internal differences of opinion regarding whether a
particular new drug application should be approved, the individuals making the ultimate
judgment will have the benefit of years of experience in reviewing such products,
scientific expertise in the area, and access to the volumes of data they can compel the
manufacturer to produce. Nor is the FDA subject to the inherent limitations of the trial
process, such as the rules of evidence, restrictions on expert testimony, and scheduling
demands.
Id. at98.
4 5 RESTATEMENT (TIMD) OF TORTS: PRODUCiS LIABn.rr § 6 (Proposed Final Draft
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1I. THE ALI's NEw PROPOSAL
A. A Rule Closely Resembling Blanket Immunity
The split in the states over pharmaceutical design defect liability has
prompted the ALI to include a separate section in the proposed Restatement
(Third) of Torts specifically governing the liability faced by sellers and
distributors of prescription drugs and medical devices.46 The AL147 has taken a
"clean slate" approach to the problem of pharmaceutical design defect liability.
The design defect liability section of the proposed Restatement, however, is not
a "restatement" of the current law practiced in most jurisdictions. 48
The relevant language of the proposed Restatement (dealing with design
defect liability) provides:
(a) A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or
otherwise distributes a defective drug or medical device is subject to liability
for harm to persons caused by the defect. A prescription drug or medical
device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise distributed only pursuant to
a health care provider's prescription.
(b) For purposes of liability under Subsection (a), a prescription drug or
medical device is defective if at the time of sale or other distribution the drug
or medical device:...
(2) is not reasonably safe due to defective design as defined in
Subsection (c) ....
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe due to
defective design if the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug or medical
device are sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits
that reasonable health care providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks and
therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for any
1997).
46 See id.
47 The drafters of the section on prescription drug and medical device product liability in
the proposed Restatement are James A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski, who two years
earlier co-authored an article proposing a revision to comment k. See Henderson & Twerski,
supra note 21.
48 The drafters specifically stated:
Mhis is not an area in which we can satis* ourselves with a restatement of the case
law. Case law that is unintelligible cannot be intelligibly restated. There is a need in this
area to clarify the issues and to provide direction to the courts as to how this very special
genre of cases can be sensibly approached.
Id. at 1545.
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class ofpatients.49
Two general observations about this Proposed Final Draft become immediately
apparent. First, this proposal combines the claims of strict liability and
negligence. The drafters intended that the proposal apply to any suit alleging a
prescription drug or medical device was defectively designed, whether
involving a strict liability or negligence claim. 50 The reason for this change is
the general belief that comment k's balancing of risks and benefits is similar to
the "reasonableness" test involved in a negligence claim. 51
4 9 RESrATEMENT (ThRD) OF TORTS: PRoDUCrs LIAB=1Y § 6 (Proposed Final Draft
1997) (emphasis added). Subsections (d) and (e), respectively concerning failure-to-warn and
manufacturing defect liability, are of little concern to this discussion and are therefore
omitted.
50 The elimination of the negligence claim has drawn much criticism. See, e.g., Richard
L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement
(Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 76, 76 (1994)
(arguing that, contrary to the beliefs of the Proposed Final Draft composers, there are
practical differences between negligence and strict liability standards in conscious design cases
due to the different psychological impact of labeling an action as one in strict liability or
negligence, the role of comparative negligence, and the availability of multiple defendants in
strict liability design claims); Angela C. Rushton, Comment, Design Defects Under the
Restatement (7hrd) of Torts: A Reassessment of Strict Liability and the Goals of a Functional
Approach, 45 EMORY L.J. 389, 428-30 (1996) (arguing that the courts have invariably noted
that when comment k is applied to preclude recovery under strict liability, the plaintiff may
still bring a case in negligence) (citing Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Lab., 447 So. 2d
1301, 1303 (Ala. 1984); Brown v. Superior Court (Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470, 483 (Cal.
1988); Kearl v. Lederle Lab., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 454 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985), overnded by
Brown; Johnson v. American Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323-24 (Kan. 1986); Feldman
v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 381 (N.J. 1984)).
51 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 475 ("Comment k has been analyzed and criticized by
numerous commentators. While there is some disagreement as to its scope and meaning, there
is a general consensus that, although it purports to explain the strict liability doctrine, in fact
the principle it states is based on negligence."); Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am.
Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297, 310 (Idaho 1987) ("As the Restatement notes, for an act to be
unreasonable and thus a breach of duty under negligence analysis, the risk must be 'of such
magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular
manner in which it is done.'") (quoting RESrAEMEN (SEcoND) OF TORTs § 291 (1965));
Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 548 P.2d 80, 86 (Idaho 1976) ("ln
negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable
conduct in the light of apparent risk."); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 21, at
1544.
To discover whether a comment k exemption from strict liability is appropriate, [courts]
undertake risk-utility balancing, insisting that this balancing process be performed as of
the time when the drug was distributed. This is nothing other than a negligence test. If a
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Second, while at first glance the proposal may seem to mirror the case-by-
case approach followed in a majority of jurisdictions, a closer analysis reveals
that the drafters swayed widely from that approach. Under the proposal, design
defect liability will be precluded unless "[t]he foreseeable risks of harm posed
by the drug or medical device are sufficiently great in relation to its therapeutic
benefits that reasonable healthcare providers, knowing of such foreseeable risks
and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe the drug or medical device for
any class of patients."52 Therefore, as long as the drug passes a reasonable
medical provider's risk-benefit .test for any class of patients, no one can
successfully sue on a design defect claim. This test differs significantly from the
case-by-case approach discussed above. The proposed Restatement apparently
abandons an overall analysis of whether the drug's risks outweigh its benefits in
relation to all potential patients in favor of a test that focuses on a narrower
class of patients. Under the ALI proposal, if the drug has therapeutic benefits
that outweigh the dangers for any class of patients, the risk-benefit test is
passed. Effectively, this precludes liability on a design defect claim, as it would
be nearly impossible to find a drug approved by the FDA which cannot pass the
risk-benefit test for at least one potential class of patients.53
While the proposed Restatement does not actually embrace the minority
blanket immunity approach, the drafters seem persuaded by many of the same
policy factors that impressed the Brown and Grundberg courts: 54
Courts have also recognized that the regulatory system governing prescription
drugs is a legitimate mechanism for setting the standards for drug design. 5 In
court finds that the product meets the threshold test for strict liability exemption, it has
perforce made a finding that the defendant was not negligent. How then can the courts
declare that the exemption is only for strict liability?
Id.
52 RESATEMENT (TIMD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS Li.urr, § 6(c) (Proposed Final Draft
1997) (emphasis added).
5 3 This change was not lost on the drafters. The drafters flatly admit: "Given this very
demanding objective standard, liability is likely to be imposed only under unusual
circumstances." RESrATEMENT (TmD) OF TORTS: PRoDucrs A rrY § 6 cmt. f
(Proposed Final Draft 1997); see also Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the
Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1383-84 (1994).
54 See supra Part ll.B (discussing the blanket immunity approach taken by Brown v.
Superior Court (Abbott Laboratories), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) and Grundberg v. Upjohn
Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991)).
55 Note the similarity of this rationale to that of the decision in Grundberg, 813 P.2d at
97 ("We find this extensive regulatory scheme capable of and appropriate for making the
preliminary determination regarding whether a prescription drug's benefits outweigh its
risks.-).
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part, this deference reflects concerns over the possible negative effects of
judicially imposed liability on the cost and availability of valuable medical
technology. This deference also rests on two further assumptions: first, that
prescribing health care providers, when adequately informed by drug
manufacturers, are able to assure that the right drugs and medical devices reach
the right patients; and second, that governmental regulatory agencies
adequately review new prescription drugs and devices, keeping unreasonably
dangerous designs off the market.5 6
The Reporters' notes accompanying the proposed Restatement further explain
the reasoning behind Section 6:
The proposed rule in Section 6(c) [concerning design defect liability] best
advances the policies and values explicated in Comment b. It shows
appropriate deference to the regulated market, where the FDA and learned
intermediaries select which drugs should be available to the public generally
and which drugs should be given to individual patients, respectively. It does
not, on the other hand, wholly exempt defendants from liability simply because
other institutions have taken steps to improve product safety.5
7
:56 R.sTATEMENT (TRD) OF ToRs: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (Proposed Final
Draft 1997). The drafters obviously have overstated their position here. While they recognize
that a growing number of courts have determined that unqualified deference to these
regulatory mechanisms is unjustified, their comments do not recognize that this view is in fact
the majority approach.
57 Id. § 6 cmt. f (Reporters' Note). The drafters included this last sentence in an attempt
to differentiate their approach from the blanket immunity approach best reflected by
GunZdberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991). The Gnimaberg court held that all
prescription drugs approved by the FDA are protected against strict liability design defect
claims. See id. at 90. The drafters included a hypothetical problem of a prescription drug
which still could be the subject of a successful design defect claim:
ABC Pharmaceuticals manufactures and distributes D, a prescription drug intended
to prolong pregnancy and thus to reduce the risks associated with premature birth.
Patricia, six months pregnant with a history of irregular heart beats, was given D during
a hospital stay. As a result, she suffered heart failure and required open heart surgery. In
Patricia's action against ABC, her expert testified that, notwithstanding FDA approval of
D, the drug did not prolong pregnancy for any class of patients and posed serious risks
of heart failure in patients with a history of irregular heart beats. Notwithstanding a
finding by the trier of fact that ABC gave adequate warnings to the prescribing
physician, the trier of fact can find that reasonably informed healthcare providers would
not prescribe D for any class of patients, thus rendering ABC subject to liability.
RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODUCTS LI~uArrY § 6 cmt. f, illus. 1 (Proposed Final
Draft 1997).
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B. A Useless Loophole?
After reading the proposed Restatement provisions, one must ask: If no
reasonable and informed medical provider would prescribe the drug to any
class of patients at some point in time, how was the drug approved by the FDA
in the first place? By refusing to recognize the grand improbability of such a
scenario, the drafters in effect created an escape hatch designed to appease
those opposing full deference to the FDA. This escape hatch seems only to
defeat the original purpose of the proposal-to provide consistency among the
courts and to reduce litigation costs. Plaintiffs will still find it plausible to
introduce the testimony of expert witnesses claiming that no reasonable,
informed doctor would prescribe the drug, while defendants will be forced to
introduce experts to counter such evidence. In essence, we are back to where
we started. Once again, the plaintiff will provide his or her experts, claiming
that no "reasonable" physician would have prescribed this drug to any patient-
no "reasonable" physician would have prescribed the product because its risks
are simply too high. Once again, the judge or jury is asked to perform a risk-
balancing test, albeit more limited in scope. The jury (or the judge on a motion
for summary judgment) will listen to both sides and decide if, in fact, a
reasonable medical doctor would prescribe the drug. While the proposed
Restatement favors manufacturers in that the drug must only pass the risk-
benefit test for one class of patients, rather than the general public at large, it
also provides a useless loophole that would rarely, if ever, succeed. It simply
increases litigation (most probably initiated to procure settlement) and generally
defeats the manifest purpose of the proposal.
C. Expanding the Blanket Immunity Approach
It seems apparent that the ALI's position closely follows the blanket
immunity approach taken by a minority of courts.58 The drafters flatly state that
the approach taken by the Restatement (Third) of Torts would make successful
claims of design defects rare. 59 This position stands in stark contrast to the case-
by-case approach used by a majority of courts,60 which stresses the value of the
tort system in reviewing design defects even in the area of pharmaceuticals. 61
58 See supra Part II.B (discussing the blanket immunity against design defect claims
granted to pharmaceutical manufacturers by some courts).
59 See supra note 53.
60 See supra Part II.A (discussing the case-by-case approach).
61 See, e.g., Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297, 313
(Idaho 1987) (iuntley, J., concurring) ("I fear the day when any supreme court can be
convinced that an agency such as the FDA, no matter how well-intentioned, can supplant the
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Furthermore, the drafters' rationale for limiting the liability for design defects
of pharmaceuticals almost mirrors the rationale of the Brown and Gnamnberg
courts, which adopted a blanket immunity approach. 62 In fact, the ALI
approach seems more pro-manufacturer in numerous ways than even the
blanket immunity approach.
One predominant difference between the ALI proposal and the blanket
immunity approach is the inclusion of medical devices under what, while not
"blanket immunity," still seems a very pro-manufacturer test for design defect
liability. All of the cases utilizing the blanket immunity approach have done so
while considering prescription drugs or vaccines, not medical devices. 63 This is
an important distinction, in that one important underlying rationale for adopting
the blanket immunity approach is that the FDA is the proper forum for making
the determination that a prescription drug's benefits outweigh its risks. Inherent
in that assertion is the courts' reliance on the extensive regulatory screening and
post-approval process required by the FDA. 64 As noted earlier, this
extensiveness, in a large measure, does not apply to medical devices. 65
Furthermore, the courts have often noted that the chemical complexity involved
in prescription drug design defect cases makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
a jury to competently make a determination as to the true benefits and risks
posed by the drug.66 This factor, again, is not necessarily applicable to medical
devices as the jury may have an easier time understanding the risks and benefits
posed by these products because they are more mechanical, rather than
chemical, in nature. Therefore, the persuasiveness of the ALI approach must be
analyzed separately for prescription drugs and medical devices because the
persuasiveness of the blanket immunity approach depends on which category is
being considered. While I believe the ALI approach to prescription drug design
American judicial system."); Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954 (Nev. 1994) ("It is
not easy to divine just why the framers of the comment [] thought that a drug manufacturer
should be excused in cases in which it manufactured a drug that was 'known' to be
dangerous. The whole idea behind strict tort liability is that the manufacturer, not the
consumer, should bear the responsibility for injuries .... "); see also Cupp, supra note 50, at
76, 105-10.
62 See supra Part I.B; supra text accompanying note 54.
63 See In re Eli Lilly & Co., Prozac Prods. Liab. Litig., 789 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Ind.
1992) (irvolving prescription drug Prozac, an anti-depressant drug); Brown v. Superior Court
(Abbott Lab.), 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988) (considering prescription drug diethylstilbestrol,
used to prevent miscarriages); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah 1991) (involving
prescription drug Halcion, used to treat insomnia); Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59
(Wash. 1996) (considering prescription drug theophylline, used to treat asthma).
64 See, e.g., supra note 44.
65 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
66 See supra note 44.
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defect liability deserves support, I find the almost-blanket immunity approach
for medical devices seriously lacking in rationale and case support. 67
Even if the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement is adopted, two
opposing models will likely continue to govern the issue of prescription drug
design defect liability. One school of thought, represented by, inter alia, the
Brown and Grundberg courts and the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts,
posits that the court system is not the appropriate forum to review the benefits
and risks of prescription drugs because that responsibility has already been
delegated and is being performed (while not perfectly, but relatively) effectively
by the FDA. A second approach, advocated by a majority of this nation's
courts as well as numerous commentators, concludes that not all prescription
drugs should be given protection from design defect liability, essentially due to
the value of the tort system in indirectly regulating the pharmaceutical industry
and the inability of the FDA to adequately protect consumers.
IV. THE FDA REGULATORY SCHEME
Those advocating the blanket immunity approach to prescription drug
design defect liability (or approaches substantially identical, such as the
proposed Restatement), find compelling support for this approach in the fact
that the FDA already makes the determination of whether or not a drug's
benefits justify its risks. This is not to say that the FDA is perfect, 68 but rather,
compared to judges and juries, the FDA is comprised of individuals with
significant expertise having access to the best available knowledge about the
particular drug in question. Therefore, the FDA necessarily makes a more
informed determination on whether a prescription drug is defectively designed.
To properly assess the persuasiveness of the blanket immunity approach, some
familiarity with the FDA regulatory scheme, both its pre-approval and post-
approval processes, is necessary. 69
67 As noted above, it is impossible to do justice to the topic of design defects by
analyzing prescription drugs and medical devices simultaneously. The policy rationales simply
do not co-exist. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
68 Such an argument would be foolish. A laundry list of FDA miscues can be readily
introduced. See, e.g., Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1972)
(noting that FDA approved drug Aralen proven to cause blindness); Feldman v. Lederle
Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984) (stating that studies showed tetracycline stained teeth
well in advance of FDA action to require warnings); Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
398 S.W.2d 640, 644 (rex. Civ. App. 1965) (noting that FDA certified drug MER-29 proven
to cause cataracts). For an excellent discussion of the limitations of the FDA, see Schwartz,
supra note 53, at 1385-90 (discussing fiscal and legal limitations, how politics influence
safety, and manpower shortages).
69 On November 11, 1997 President Clinton signed the Food and Drug
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A. The General FDA Regulatory Scheme
A pharmaceutical company seeking to receive FDA approval for a
prescription drug it desires to market must first file an investigational new drug
application with the agency. This application requires the pharmaceutical
company to provide information on the drug's chemistry, pharmacology, and
toxicology, as well as the results of any animal and laboratory testing. 70 This
application must be filed, and approved by the FDA, before human trials on the
drug can commence. 71
The human clinical trial process consists of three phases. Phase I involves
testing on only a small number of healthy adults and is designed to provide
information concerning "the metabolism and pharmacologic actions of the drug
in humans, [and] the side effects associated with increasing doses." 72 Upon the
successful completion of Phase I, Phase II commences. This phase is broader in
scope and usually involves trials with two hundred to three hundred people
afflicted with the disease or illness the drug is designed to treat. The purpose of
Phase II is "to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug for a particular indication
or indications in patients with the disease or condition under study," and any
resulting side effects. 73 Successful Phase I[ completion leads to Phase Hm
testing, which involves a much larger sample of one thousand to three thousand
patients afflicted with the disease or illness.74 As Phase II testing reaches its
Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296. While
some consumer groups have claimed that the Act will adversely affect consumers, see Green
Lightfor Streamlined Drug Approvals, CHEMICAL MARKE REP., Oct. 13, 1997, at 7, 18, the
Act will have little effect on the FDA regulatory approval process discussed in this Comment.
The legislation does more to "speed-up" rather than "streamline" the approval process for
ordinary prescription drugs. The Act accomplishes this by authorizing the employment of 600
new reviewers by the FDA-reviewers paid for by pharmaceutical companies. The
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America has estimated that the $327 million
collected from the pharmaceutical industry since 1992 has cut the average review time for the
FDA nearly in half. See Thoroughly Modern, Med Ad News, Jan. 1, 1998, available in 1998
WL 10478901. The Act will, however, allow certain drugs to obtain approval through the use
of an independent testing firm rather than the FDA. Nonetheless, the FDA will continue to be
responsible for the approval of drugs thought to be closer determinations. The Act also allows
the FDA to grant conditional approval to certain drugs used to treat life-threatening or serious
conditions.
70 See 21 C.F.R. § 312 (1997).
71 See generally David A. Kessler, The Regulation of Investigational Drugs, 320 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 281 (1989) (reviewing FDA regulation of investigational drugs).
72 21 C.F.R. § 312.21(a) (1997).
73 Id. § 312.21(b).
74 See id. § 312.21(c).
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conclusion, the pharmaceutical company often submits to the FDA a New Drug
Application (NDA) for the drug. This NDA is a compilation of all available
data on the drug's efficacy and safety.75
The FDA review process of a new drug often takes years76 after the FDA
receives the NDA.77 Furthermore, the FDA review process is expensive: a
1987 estimate placed the cost of the NDA review process at $231 million.78
The ultimate approval by the FDA reflects a risk-benefit judgment that the
product will enhance public health. 79
The FDA's involvement with a drug does not end once approval is granted.
The drug's manufacturer is required to share all subsequently observed risk
information with the FDA. 80 A comprehensive, post-marketing system of
reporting and record-keeping requires that the manufacturer report adverse side
effects discovered in clinical, epidemiological, or surveillance studies, through
review of the medical literature, or otherwise. 81
75 See id. § 314.50 (describing the specific requirements of a New Drug Application). A
New Drug Application must include:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to show whether or not
such drug is safe for use and whether the drug is effective in use;
(B) a full list of the articles used as components of such drug;
(C) a full statement of the composition of such drug;
(D) a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and controls used
for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such drug;
(E) such samples of such drug and the articles used as components thereof as the
Secretary may require; and,
(F) specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (1994).
76 The process typically takes five to seven years. See Mary T. Griffin, AIDS Drugs &
the PharmaceuticalIndustry:A Need for Reform, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 363, 378 n.90 (1991)
(citing Gordon, The Drug Development and Approval Process, in PHARmCAcEnCAL MFRS.
ASS'N, NEw MEDICuNEs IN Rnv w 5 (1990)).
77 See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An
Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SmN HALL L. REv.
1437, 1444 (1994); see also Kessler, supra note 71, at 283 ("A study of 637 NDAs received
since 1981 found that the FDA returned two thirds to the sponsor with requests for more
information.").
7 8 See Viscusi et al., supra note 77, at 1444 n.30.
79 See Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L.
REv. 1, 10 (1973); Viscusi et al., supra note 77, at 1444 (quoting Bruce N. Kuhlik & Richard
F. Kingham, The Adverse Effects of Standardless Punitive Damage Awards on
PharmaceuticalDevelopments and Availability, 45 FooD DRuG CosM. L.J. 693, 695 (1990)).
80 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.80 (1997).
81 See id. §§ 310.303(a), 314.80(c); see also Viscusi et al., supra note 77, at 1447 n.46.
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B. The FDA Scheme in Action
Tetramune, a childhood vaccine developed and marketed by Lederle
Laboratories which protects against diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and
Heamophilus b, provides an illustration of how the FDA scheme really works.
Tetramune is a good case study for two reasons. First, the vaccine was
approved in 1992, so the regulatory action taken with respect to the vaccine is
indicative of contemporary regulation in this area. Second, while Lederle
Laboratories has not yet been subject to product liability over Tetramune, a
main component of the Tetramune vaccine is Tri-Inmunol8 2 (the diphtheria,
tetanus, and pertussis-DPT-portion of the combined vaccine), a vaccine that
has spawned much litigation. 83
When the FDA approves a drug or vaccine, the agency prepares a
82 Tri-Immunol was the only combined diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis ("DPT")
vaccine on the United States market for nearly two decades. Tri-Immunol is a so-called whole
cell vaccine because it contains whole killed pertussis organisms. During the 1950s Eli Lilly
Company developed a fractionated version of the pertussis vaccine called Tri-Solgen that was
developed in the hope that it would reduce the adverse effects of the whole cell version. Eli
Lilly exited the vaccine market, however, and the FDA never relicensed the fractionated
version, the rights of which were sold to Wyeth Laboratories. In early 1997, however,
Lederle Laboratories received FDA approval for its version of the fractionated vaccine. See
Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297, 300-01 (Idaho 1987).
The moral of the story is that at the time Tri-Immunol was used by the claimants in litigation
involving the vaccine, it was the only DPT vaccine approved by the FDA.
83 See, e.g., Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988); Pease
v. American Cyanamid Co., 795 F. Supp. 755 (D. Md. 1992); Jones v. Lederle Lab., A
Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 785 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D.N.Y.), affdper curiam, 982 F.2d 63
(2d Cir. 1992); Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297 (Idaho
1987). Another compelling reason for focusing on the DPT vaccine is that it illustrates one of
the case-by-case approach's greatest downfalls-inconsistency. In Toner, the Idaho Supreme
Court was asked to decide whether or not Tri-Immunol should be afforded comment k
protection from a design defect claim. The jury had awarded the plaintiff $1,131,200. The
Idaho Supreme Court refused to make the determination that Tri-Immunol was precluded
from a design defect claim. Instead, it deferred to the trial court's determination that the
vaccine's risks outweighed its benefits. See Toner, 732 P.2d at 299, 308-09. In Pease, by
contrast, the district court judge refused to allow the plaintiff to recover on a design defect
claim:
Briefly put, how can Tri-Immunol be said to be "unreasonably dangerous" if there is a
strong consensus among the majority of physicians and scientists who have studied the
issue that whole cell DPT vaccine has not been shown to cause permanent neurological
damage and that it is at least as efficacious as any other available vaccine?
Pease, 795 F. Supp. at 758.
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"Summary Basis of Approval," which outlines, among other things, the studies
that have been made of the product and a discussion of the product's benefits. 84
A cursory look at the Summary Basis of Approval for Tetramune provides
insights into the degree of testing the FDA requires of a drug or vaccine
manufacturer. The safety of Tetramune was tested in a study involving 6497
infants in California who received three injections at approximately two, four,
and six months of age.85 The test examined 1347 of the 6497 infants to
determine if there were differences in systemic reactions between those infants
receiving Tetramune and those receiving separate shots of Tri-Immunol and
HbOC (IIibTfRER) (separate Haemophilus b vaccine). 86 A second study of
Tetramune's safety analyzed a randomized enrollment of 378 infants at five
clinical centers who received the Tetramune vaccine to see if any systemic and
acute local adverse effects occurred within seventy-two hours of injection.87 A
similar study was conducted on toddlers who were given Tetramune.8 8 In
addition to these studies, Lederle Laboratories has agreed to conduct post-
approval studies to help insure that any suspect discrepancies between infants
receiving Tetramune and Tri-mmunol were mere chance.8 9
The Summary Basis of Approval for Tetramune also discusses the benefits
that the original DPT vaccines, including Tri-Immunol, have had on public
health. It noted that in 1921, before the general use of a diphtheria vaccine,
over 200,000 cases of diphtheria were reported. Only fifteen cases of the
disease were reported between 1980 and 1983.90 Similarly, the "incidence of
tetanus in the United States has dropped dramatically with the routine use of
tetanus toxoid." 91 Finally, the danger of pertussis, a highly communicable
disease with an attack rate in unimmunized households of over ninety percent,
has diminished dramatically. In 1950, pertussis accounted for 120,000 cases
and 1100 deaths. In recent years, an average of 3500 cases appear annually,
claiming approximately ten lives each year.92 Due to this marked improvement,
it is not difficult to understand how the FDA made the determination that the
vaccine's benefits to public health outweighed its risks. It is, however, difficult
84 These documents are available from the FDA via the Freedom of Information Act.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
85 See D pARTMENT Op HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REF. No. 92-0003, SUMMARY
BAsIs OF APPRovAL-TErRAMuNE 7 (1992).
86 See id.
87 See id. at 11.
88 See id. at 13.
89 See id. at 10.
90 See id. at 5.
91 Id. at 6.
92 See id.
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to imagine how a court could hold Lederle responsible under a strict liability
theory claiming that Tri-Immunol was an unreasonably dangerous product
when it was the only vaccine for these diseases on the market at that time.
93
The inconsistent results of DPT litigation94 highlight the concerns voiced by
adherents to the "blanket immunity" approach. An analysis of jury verdicts in
DPT cases illustrates the contention asserted by the Grundberg court that juries
are not the appropriate forum to make design defect determinations. 95 Consider
the following inconsistencies from cases all considering the same issue-
whether a pharmaceutical manufacturer should be held liable for defectively
designing the same DPT vaccine and the damages (if any) imposed upon the
manufacturer: (1) a jury in Kansas returned a $15 million verdict in favor of a
plaintiff who suffered permanent brain damage; 96 (2) a jury in Ohio returned a
$2.1 million verdict in favor of a plaintiff who suffered permanent brain
damage;97 (3) juries returned defense verdicts (no award) in Louisiana,98
California, 99 and Florida. 10
V. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE INVOLVEMENT
A. A Plea for National Guidance
Whether all prescription drugs should be insulated from design defect
liability is, undeniably, a policy question.' 0 ' Some claim that the FDA cannot
93 See Toner v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 P.2d 297, 312-13
(Idaho 1987).
94 See supra note 83.
95 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
96 See Graham v. Wyeth Lab., Inc., No. 85-1481P (D. Kan. 1987) (LEXIS, Verdct
Library, Allver File).
97 See White v. Wyatt Lab., Inc., No. 712-20 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1986) (LEXIS, Verdct
Library, Allver File).
98 See Caruso v. Lawrence, No. 77913 A, 1992 WL 677859 (La. Dist. Ct. St.
Tammany County 1992) (plaintiff suffered severe mental deficiency).
99 See Bovey v. Parke, Davis & Co., No. 84993 (Cal. Super. Ct. Solano County 1988)
(LEXIS, Verdct Library, Allver File) (plaintiff suffered severe brain damage); Coppo v.
Connaught Lab., No. V08479 (Cal. Super. Ct. Contra Costa County 1987) (LEXIS, Verdct
Library, Allver File) (plaintiff suffered brain damage).
10 See Knudsen v. Connaught Lab., No. 85-703-Civ-J-16 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (LEXIS,
Verdet Library, Allver File) (plaintiff died); Zofay v. Lederle Lab., A Div. of Am.
Cyanamid Co., No. 85-3021 CA (L) I (Fla. Palm Beach County Ct. 1988) (LEXIS, Verdct
Library, Allver File) (plaintiff rendered incompetent).
101 The Supreme Court recently decided that, absent clear congressional language to the
contrary, compliance with national food and drag laws will not pre-empt state tort law
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adequately determine if the risks of a prescription drug outweigh its benefits,
therefore, and since it is impossible to determine how safe a product really is,
the risk of the drug's dangers should rest with the manufacturer, who stands to
benefit financially from the prescription drug's sale.102 These critics advocate
that a strong tort system is needed to help insure the safety of prescription
drugs, primarily because the current regulatory system is under-staffed and
under-funded.
On the other hand, advocates for design defect immunity counter with
competing policy considerations. The cost of pharmaceuticals is already too
high in the United States,103 in large part because of the litigation I°4 and
liability costs drug manufacturers must bear.10 5 Furthermore, they argue, the
availability of drugs may be severely curtailed if drug companies are subject to
design defect liability. Moreover, design defect liability in this field forces the
court or jury to make determinations about a drug's risks and benefits that it is
simply ill-equipped to make. That determination is already made by the FDA, a
more appropriate and informed forum for such balancing. Finally, fundamental
fairness dictates that a pharmaceutical company should not be sued on the
design of its drug when the FDA has already approved it.
Criticism of courts advocating a case-by-case approach cannot rest in
finding fault with the way in which they have "interpreted" the law. There is,
remedies. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2250 (1996).
102 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1386-95. The pharmaceutical industry enjoys
the "highest return on sales, the highest return on assets, and the highest return on stockholder
equity of any industrial group in the Fortune 500." Do We Pay Too Much for Presaciptions?,
58 CoNsuME REP. 668, 669 (1993).
103 Consumers in the United States pay 62% more for prescription drugs than Canadians
and 54% more than Europeans. See Schwartz, supra note 53, at 1400 n.279 (citing STAFF OF
SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 102D CONG., 1sr SEss., THE DRUG MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRY: A PPESCR]PTON FOR PROFrrs 7 (Comm. Print 1991)).
104 Some commentators have noted that total litigation costs have exceeded total plaintiff
recoveries in the area of prescription drug design liability. See Viscusi et al., supra note 77, at
1461.
105 The effect of litigation and liability costs on pharmaceutical companies has been
difficult to measure, mostly because of the difficulties in acquiring such information from
pharmaceutical manufacturers. For an excellent discussion on this point, see Schwartz, supra
note 53, at 1398-405 (citing OFFICE, OF TECHNOLOGY AssESSMENT, PHARMACEUrcAL R&D:
Cosrs, RISK, AND REwARDs 170 (1993) (concluding that the cost implications caused by
product liability law in the pharmaceutical industry are difficult to discern due to the lack of
information released by the industry); STEvEN GARnER, PRODUCr LABIIY AND THE
ECONOMICS OF PHARMACEICALS AND MEDICAL DEviCES xxv (1993) (concluding that
critical information concerning research and development activities provided to regulators has
not been made available to the public)).
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in fact, little law on the subject, except for judge-made common law. 106
National legislation on the issue of pharmaceutical design defect liability is long
overdue. Congress has the authority to regulate in this field and can pre-empt
state tort law under its broad Commerce Clause powers. For example,
Congress continues to consider bills that would cap punitive damages in all
product liability actions in state and federal courts to two times the sum of
plaintiff's economic and noneconomic losses, or $250,000, whichever is
greater. 107 The field of drugs is already regulated nationally. In fact, while the
federal food and drug laws do not purport to pre-empt state law remedies, they
clearly establish that no state can force drug manufacturers to meet additional
requirements before their products can be sold in a particular state.108 While
state legislative determinations on design defect liability might be an
improvement over the current situation, in that the policy question is answered
democratically, it seems counterproductive and fundamentally unfair for
claimants to be treated differently depending on the state in which they happen
to get injured. It makes little theoretical sense to allow a claimant to collect on a
design defect claim involving the drug Halcion in Ohio, but not in Utah. This is
not to say that states should not take the responsibility to protect the health of
their citizens. Rather, it is time to recognize that prescription drugs and
vaccines are a field for which the federal government has been given that
responsibility.
106 Courts which have considered the issue of design defect liability have relied on
comment k, a policy instituted by unelected legal leaders without the force of law. See
RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A cmt. k (1965).
107 See S. 648, 105th Cong. § 108 (1997); S. 5, 105th Cong. § 108 (1997). Many states
have precluded punitive damages in drug design defect cases when FDA approval was given
for the drug and no fraud was involved. See ApIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (West 1992);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c) (West 1987 & Supp. 1997); OHo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.80(c) (Anderson 1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 30.927 (1992); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
2(1992).
108 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994).
[N]o State or political subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with
respect to a device intended for human use any requirement-(1) which is different from,
or in addition to, any requirement applicable to the device, and (2) which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device ....
Id. Pharmaceutical manufacturers have claimed that common-law tort actions create an
additional "requirement" which violates this provision. This argument was finally put to rest
by the Supreme Court inMedtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2258-59 (1996).
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B. National Legislation Proposals
If national legislation were pursued, what would it look like? A number of
possibilities are plausibly available. First, Congress could pass a statute
establishing a rebuttal presumption that any prescription drug or vaccine which
has received FDA approval, absent fraud, is not defectively designed. This
presumption could be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence that the
drug's risks should have been known to far outweigh the drug's benefits. This
strategy appropriately recognizes the work done by the FDA, while not totally
precluding design defect review. A situation may arise in which the drug's
approval was a close call within the FDA and that determination later leads to
disastrous results. In such a case, policy considerations may tilt the balance
toward allowing the injured party to sue. The main disadvantage of this
approach is the uncertainty of its application. Would a rebuttable presumption
really make much of a difference? Would an injured person still bring suit
hoping to convince a sympathetic jury of her case?
Second, Congress could set up a separate body within the FDA to
adjudicate claims involving design defects. If the agency determines that the
plaintiff should have recourse against the manufacturer, a separate fund could
be established.' 09 This approach has the advantage of consistency and, more
importantly, the risk-benefit determination is made by more qualified
individuals. 10 Such a scheme, however, may not pass constitutional muster. A
plaintiff who wants to sue a pharmaceutical company has a right to a jury trial
109 Congress pursued a similar strategy with the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (amended 1987, 1989, 1990, and 1991). This
Act created an administrative "no-fault" program to compensate children injured by vaccines
as an alternative to state tort remedies. Congress was able to avoid abrogating plaintiffi'
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by providing that a plaintiff has the choice of
bringing her action as usual through the courts or bringing it in front of a special master under
the statute. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-16(c) (1994). The payments made under the statute are
financed by a federal excise tax on vaccine sales. Plaintiffs pursuing a design defect claim
regarding DPT now almost universally bring their action under the statute, even though
damages are limited to $250,000 plus economic damages. Use of the statute effectively has
foreclosed the entire argument of whether or not comment k should apply to DPT. See
generally Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988).
110 In England, the Legal Aid Board has proposed a medical tribunal with a legal
chairman to investigate drug injury claims. The proposal followed mass litigation, costing £35
million of legal fees, involving tranquilizers and sleeping pills whereby not a single claimant
recovered. So far, no product liability claim against a drug company has succeeded in English
courts. See Clare Dyer, Plea to Simplify Drug Injury Cases, TIm GUARDIAN (U.K.), June 14,
1994, at 4. Almost all European countries recognize a policy similar to comment k. They
refer to it as the "development risk defense." See David McIntosh, Dangers in the Toy Box,
FINANciAL Tl (U.K.), Jan. 24, 1995, at 14.
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that may be difficult to overcome.111 The proposed suggestion may be able to
survive constitutional attack, however, since prescription drugs are such a
heavily regulated industry.' 12
Third, Congress could explicitly pre-empt state tort law design defect
claims involving prescription drugs and vaccines that were given FDA
approval, absent fraud. This approach has the advantage of clarity and best
accomplishes the policy goal of drug availability and affordability. 113 It also
best accomplishes the goal of reducing frivolous litigation costs.
This third option, federal pre-emption of state law prescription drug design
defect claims, is the wisest choice. It has the advantage of consistency in
application and defers the risk-benefit determination to the FDA, a body better
equipped to assess such a determination. Also, the elimination of the design
defect claim does not leave the plaintiff without a remedy. The claimant can still
sue on a failure-to-warn or a manufacturing defect claim, or on a fraud theory.
Furthermore, if a mass tort involving a prescription drug does occur, injured
111 See generally KEOEM CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMNISIRATIVE
LAw ThRAmSE § 2.8, at 90-102 (3d ed. 1994) (outlining Supreme Court jurisprudence
concerning agency adjudication of "private rights").
112 It could be argued that the proposed scheme is really no different than workers'
compensation and OSHA adjudications, categories of disputes courts have held can be
constitutionally adjudicated outside of an Article Ill court. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v.
Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 449-61 (1977) (holding that
the Seventh Amendment does not bar Congress from assigning OSHA adjudications to an
administrative agency); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (workers' compensation).
Federal courts acquiesce in the congressional transfer of these disputes (among others) from
their dockets to specialized administrative tribunals because courts are institutionally unable to
effectively resolve them. In Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1986), the Court pronounced a pragmatic approach to determining whether an administrative
agency may constitutionally resolve a class of disputes. The following passage indicates the
pragmatism of that approach:
[Were we to hold that the Legislative Branch may not permit such limited cognizance of
common law counterclaims at the election of the parties, it is clear that we would "defeat
the obvious purpose of the Legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and
inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly
suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned
to that task."
Id. at 856 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 46). One could argue that in the complex
area of prescription drugs, an administrative agency such as the FDA is the only
governmental body with the expertise to effectively adjudicate prescription drug design defect
disputes.
113 Such heavy reliance on the FDA may conflict with a desire to streamline the FDA
approval process.
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consumers are not automatically without remedy. A national fund could be
established or pharmaceutical manufacturers may be forced to provide
consumers relief, not because the law requires them to, but because sound
marketing policy encourages it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ALI's efforts in the pharmaceutical product liability field should be
commended. Perhaps the most encouraging aspect of the ALI's efforts is the
recognition that prescription products require separate treatment, as evidenced
by the devotion of an entire section in the proposed Restatement (Third) of
Torts concerning the liability of pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The most intriguing aspect of the protection accorded to prescription drug
manufacturers is the shift in rationale for this separate treatment. In the 1960s,
when comment k was introduced, the protection it provided to at least some
prescription drugs and vaccines represented a policy decision made by courts to
encourage and maintain drug development. The policy decision weighed the
availability and affordability of prescription drugs and vaccines against the
consumer's ability to redress injuries allegedly caused by a dangerous product.
While the original policy rationale for according pharmaceutical products
protection from product liability, and design defect liability in particular,
certainly still exists, it has in large part been supplanted by concerns of
fundamental fairness and propriety. Many courts, best represented by the Utah
Supreme Court, now justify their decision to preclude plaintiff recovery by
asserting that the legal system, through judges or juries, is not the appropriate
forum in which to ponder the relative risks and benefits of prescription drugs.
Unlike most other products, that decision is already specifically mandated to a
federal governmental body. The reason for this shift in focus is two-fold. First,
more attention has been focused on the inappropriateness of asking lay juries to
decide complex scientific questions, especially if those questions are already
answered by a body more equipped to do so. 114 Second, the lack of empirical
114 See generally Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizenship Comprehension of Difficult Issues:
Lessons for Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 727 (1991); Steven I. Friedland, The
Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 190 (1990);
Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence:
A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity ", 25 CoNN. L. REv. 1083
(1993); Jody Weisberg Menon, Adversarial Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay Jurors:
A Proposal for Medical Malpractice Reform, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 281 (1995); Joseph
Sanders, Jury Deliberation in a Complex Case: Havner & Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals,
JusT. Sys. J., 1993, at 45; William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 132 F.R.D. 575
(1991); Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach to Comple Civil Litigation in the Federal
Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 575; Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice:
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data supporting the original policy decision protecting pharmaceutical
manufacturers, concerning the effect of product liability litigation on the
affordability and development of new drugs, has required courts desiring to
keep the protection to develop additional rationales for their decisions.
This shift in focus should eventually result in national legislation pre-
empting all state tort law prescription drug design defect claims. While the
1960s policy rationale for protecting prescription drug and vaccine
manufacturers from design defect claims continues to provide support, that
support is insufficient in itself. The lack of empirical support for its assertions
weakens its persuasiveness, especially in a day and age when decisionmakers
place a premium on empirical data. Moreover, when courts claim policy
reasons support their claim that pharmaceutical companies should be protected
from design defect liability, they are necessarily confronted by opposing policy
considerations asserting that the public is not "better off" with such a policy.
These opposing arguments are strong. These considerations have shifted the
focus of the inquiry, from which approach promotes public policy, to which
approach is fundamentally fair. A drug design defect claim requires a detailed
analysis of the drug's risks and benefits. That inquiry should be made by the
individuals best equipped to make that decision. Since that decision is made at
the national level, national legislation should be initiated to recognize this fact.
The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
1683 (1992); Joseph C. Wilkinson, Jr. et al., A Bicentennial Transition: Modem Alternatives
to Seventh Amendment Jury Trial in Complex Cases, 37 U. KAN. L. REV. 61 (1988); Keith
Broyles, Note, Taking the Counroom into the Classroom: A Proposal for Educatng the Lay
Juror in Comple Litigation Cases, 64 GFo. WASH. L. REy. 714 (1996).
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